Economic Science and Political Influence

Saint-Paul, Gilles (2012) Economic Science and Political Influence. TSE Working Paper, n. 12-365, Toulouse

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Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/26617

Abstract

When policymakers and private agents use models, the economists who de-
sign the model have an incentive to alter it in order infuence outcomes in a
fashion consistent with their own preferences. I discuss some consequences of
the existence of such ideological bias. In particular, I analyze the role of mea-
surement infrastructures such as national statisticall institutes, the extent to
which intellectual competition between different schools of thought may lead to
polarization of views over some parameters and at the same time to consensus
over other parameters, and finally how the attempt to preserve influence can
lead to degenerative research programs.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: 27 November 2012
Place of Publication: Toulouse
Uncontrolled Keywords: Ideology, Macroeconomics modelling, Self-confirming equilibria, Polarization, Autocoherent Models, Intellectual Competition, Degenerative Research programs, Identification
JEL codes: A11 - Role of Economics; Role of Economists; Market for Economists
E6 - Macroeconomic Policy Formation, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, Macroeconomic Policy, and General Outlook
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 09 Jul 2014 17:31
Last Modified: 20 Mar 2018 14:20
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:26617
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/15466

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