Coalition Formation and Environmental Policies in International Oligopoly Markets

Cavagnac, Michel and Cheikbossian, Guillaume (2012) Coalition Formation and Environmental Policies in International Oligopoly Markets. TSE Working Paper, n. 12-364

[img]
Preview
Text
Download (367kB) | Preview
Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/26607

Abstract

This paper analyzes the problem of international environmental cooperation as a coalition
formation game. For this purpose, we develop a simple model with three countries of unequal size. Strate-
gic interactions between those countries come from the imperfect competition among producers in global
markets and from the transboundary pollution generated by the ?rms. To capture e¢ ciency gains from
coordinating policies, countries can join a coalition and sign an international environmental agreement.
The equilibrium coalition structure then depends on the country-size asymmetry and on the marginal
environmental damage. Interestingly, we show that the grand coalition is less likely to emerge as an equi-
librium outcome once two countries form a subcoalition. Furthermore, the further enlargement of the
initial subcoalition can be blocked either by the outsider or by the insiders.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Date: April 2012
JEL codes: F55 - International Institutional Arrangements
H23 - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 09 Jul 2014 17:31
Last Modified: 07 Mar 2018 13:22
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:26607
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/15462

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item

Downloads

Downloads per month over past year