Sequential Legislative Lobbying

Le Breton, Michel, Sudhölter, Peter and Zaporozhets, Vera (2012) Sequential Legislative Lobbying. LERNA Working Paper, n. 12.19.376, Toulouse

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Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/26541

Abstract

In this paper, we analyze the equilibrium of a sequential game-theoretical model of lobbying, due to Groseclose and Snyder (1996), describing a legislature that vote over two alternatives, where two opposing lobbies compete by bidding for legislators?votes. In this model, the lobbyist moving ?rst suffers from a second mover advantage and will make an offer to a panel of legislators only if it deters any credible counter-reaction from his opponent, i.e., if he anticipates to win the battle. This paper departs from the existing literature in assuming that legislators care about the consequence of their votes rather than their votes per se. Our main focus is on the calculation of the smallest
budget that the lobby moving ?rst needs to win the game and on the distribution of this budget across the legislators. We study the impact of the key parameters of the game on these two variables and show the connection of this problem with the combinatorics of sets and notions from cooperative game theory.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: May 2012
Place of Publication: Toulouse
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: Université Toulouse 1 Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 09 Jul 2014 17:30
Last Modified: 20 Mar 2018 14:18
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:26541
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/15438

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