Bidding in a Possibly Common-Value Auction

Fong, Yuk-fai and Garrett, Daniel F. (2010) Bidding in a Possibly Common-Value Auction. Games and Economic Behavior, 70 (n°2). pp. 494-501.

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Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/26404

Abstract

We analyze a second-price auction with two bidders in which only one of the bidders
is informed as to whether the object is valued commonly. We show that any equilibrium
strategy of the bidder who is uninformed must be part of an equilibrium when both bidders
instead know that the auction is not common value, regardless of the way in which the
values are different. We derive su¢ cient conditions for equilibrium existence.

Item Type: Article
Language: French
Date: November 2010
Refereed: Yes
JEL codes: D44 - Auctions
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 09 Jul 2014 17:30
Last Modified: 06 Apr 2018 10:40
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:26404
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/15419

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