A dynamic duopoly investment game without commitment under unecrtain market expansion

Boyer, Marcel, Lasserre, Pierre and Moreaux, Michel (2012) A dynamic duopoly investment game without commitment under unecrtain market expansion. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 30 (n°6). pp. 663-681.

This is the latest version of this item.

Full text not available from this repository.
Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/26242
Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: November 2012
Refereed: Yes
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 09 Jul 2014 17:29
Last Modified: 06 Apr 2018 10:11
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:26242
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/15388

Available Versions of this Item

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item