Inventories and Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership in Two-period Cournot Oligopoly

Mitraille, Sébastien and Moreaux, Michel (2012) Inventories and Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership in Two-period Cournot Oligopoly. TSE Working Paper, n. 12-322, Toulouse

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Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/26045

Abstract

Two-period Cournot competition between n identical firms producing at constant marginal cost and able to store before selling has pure strategy Nash-perfect equilibria, in which some firms store to exert endogenously a leadership over rivals. The number of firms storing balances market share gains, obtained by accumulating early the output, with losses in margin resulting from increased sales and higher operation costs. This number and the industry inventories are non monotonic in n. Concentration (HHI) and aggregate sales increase due to the strategic use of inventories.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: February 2012
Place of Publication: Toulouse
JEL codes: D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: Université Toulouse 1 Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 09 Jul 2014 17:27
Last Modified: 20 Mar 2018 13:57
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:26045
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/15348

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