Income taxation of couples and the tax unit choice

Cremer, Helmuth, Lozachmeur, Jean-Marie and Pestieau, Pierre (2012) Income taxation of couples and the tax unit choice. Journal of Population Economics, 25 (2). pp. 763-778.

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Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/26038

Abstract

We study the optimal income taxation of couples. We determine the resulting intra-family labor supply allocation and its implication for the choice of the tax unit (individual versus joint taxation). We provide a general condition for full joint taxation to arise. We also study how the spouses’ respective labor supply decisions are distorted when the condition does not hold. In particular, we show that, depending on the pattern of mating, the celebrated result according to which the spouse with the more elastic labor supply faces the lower marginal tax rates may or may not hold in our setting.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: 2012
Refereed: Yes
JEL codes: D10 - General
H21 - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
H31 - Household
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 09 Jul 2014 17:27
Last Modified: 07 Mar 2018 13:22
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:26038
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/15343

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