Stability and Fairness in Models with a Multiple Membership

Le Breton, Michel, Moreno-Ternero, Juan D., Savvateev, Alexei and Weber, Shlomo (2012) Stability and Fairness in Models with a Multiple Membership. TSE Working Paper, n. 12-300

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Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/25806

Abstract

This article studies a model of coalition formation for the joint production (and finance) of public projects, in which agents may belong to multiple coalitions. We show that, if projects are divisible, there always exists a stable (secession-proof) structure, i.e., a structure in which no coalition would reject a proposed arrangement. When projects are in-divisible, stable allocations may fail to exist and, for those cases, we resort to the least core in order to estimate the degree of instability. We also examine the compatibility of stability and fairness on metric
environments with indivisible projects. To do so, we explore, among other things, the performance of several well-known solutions (such as the Shapley value, the nucleolus, or the Dutta-Ray value) in these environments.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: May 2012
JEL codes: C71 - Cooperative Games
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 09 Jul 2014 17:25
Last Modified: 07 Mar 2018 13:22
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:25806
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/15271

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