Tools
Tools
Renault, Jérôme
, Solan, Eilon and Vieille, Nicolas
(2010)
Dynamic Sender-Receiver Games.
, Toulouse
There is a more recent version of this item available.
Preview |
Text
Download (305kB) | Preview |
Official URL : http://tse-fr.eu/pub/23618
Abstract
We consider a dynamic version of sender-receiver games, where the sequence of states
follows a Markov chain observed by the sender. Under mild assumptions, we characterize
the limit set of equilibrium payoffs. We obtain a strong dichotomy property: either only
uninformative “babbling” equilibria exist, or we can slightly perturb the game so that
all equilibrium payoffs can be achieved with strategies where, in most of the stages, the
sender reveals the true state to the receiver.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | July 2010 |
| Place of Publication: | Toulouse |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Institution: | Université Toulouse 1 Capitole |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 09 Jul 2014 17:16 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Apr 2021 15:47 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:23618 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/15087 |
Available Versions of this Item
- Dynamic Sender-Receiver Games. (deposited 09 Jul 2014 17:16) [Currently Displayed]
