Prosecution and Leniency Programs: a Fool's Game

Sauvagnat, Julien (2010) Prosecution and Leniency Programs: a Fool's Game. TSE Working Paper, n. 10-188

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Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/23201

Abstract

We present a model where the Antitrust Authority is privately informed about the strength of the case against a given cartel. In this context, the Antitrust Authority may obtain cartel members' confessions even when it opens an investigation knowing that it has no chance to find hard evidence. More generally, we show that offering leniency allows to raise the conviction rate, which in turn enhances cartel desistance and cartel deterrence. A second contribution of the paper is to show that the optimal leniency scheme involves a single informant rule. That is, amnesty should be given only if a unique cartel member reports information.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: 16 September 2010
Uncontrolled Keywords: Antitrust law and policy, Cartels, Collusion, Self-reporting
JEL codes: K21 - Antitrust Law
K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
L41 - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: Toulouse School of Economics - TSE
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 09 Jul 2014 17:14
Last Modified: 18 Oct 2017 15:15
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:23201
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/15069

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