Political Predation and Economic Development

Azam, Jean-Paul, Bates, Robert H. and Biais, Bruno (2009) Political Predation and Economic Development. Economics & Politics, vol. 21 (n° 2). pp. 255-277.

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Abstract

We analyze a game between citizens and governments, whose type (benevolent or predatory) is unknown to the public. Opportunistic governments mix between predation and restraint. As long as restraint is observed, political expectations improve, people enter the modern sector, and the economy grows. Once there is predation, the reputation of the government is ruined and the economy collapses. If citizens are unable to overthrow this government, the collapse is durable. Otherwise, a new government is drawn and the economy can rebound. Consistent with stylized facts, equilibrium political and economic histories are random, unstable, and exhibit long-term divergence

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: July 2009
Refereed: Yes
Uncontrolled Keywords: ECONOMIC development, ECONOMIC history, EQUILIBRIUM (Economics), WAR— Economic aspects, GOVERNMENT policy, PRODUCTIVITY accounting, ECONOMIC expansion, SELF-employed, EMINENT domain
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE > B1- Généralités
D- SCIENCES POLITIQUES > D3- Institution et Administration
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse), TSM Research (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 31 Mar 2015 11:19
Last Modified: 13 Nov 2018 15:50
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/14658

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