Pollution Permits and Compliance Strategies

Laffont, Jean-Jacques and Tirole, Jean (1996) Pollution Permits and Compliance Strategies. Journal of Public Economics, 62 (1). pp. 85-125.

This is the latest version of this item.

Full text not available from this repository.
Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/741


This paper analyzes the impact of spot and futures markets for tradeable pollution permits on the potential polluters' compliance decisions. Polluters can buy permits, invest in pollution abatement, or else stop production or source out. We show that stand-alone spot markets induce excessive investment. The introduction of a futures market reduces this incentive to invest, but is not the optimal way to control pollution. A menu of options on pollution rights, possibly coupled with intertemporally bundled sales, yields higher welfare. Because of its focus on long-run demand elasticities and rent extraction, this paper can be applied to a variety of situations such as demand-side management, public transportation, bypass in telecommunications, or forward sales by a private monopolist.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: October 1996
Refereed: Yes
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 18 Jan 2012 05:45
Last Modified: 28 May 2019 23:01
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:741
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/1004

Available Versions of this Item

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item